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This study examines the effects of acquisition reform 
on Women-Owned Small Businesses (WOSBs) and Small 
Disadvantaged Businesses (SDBs) who contracted with DOD 
during the 1990s through 2002 timeframe. Review and 
analysis of DOD data for fiscal years 1992 through 2002, an 
analysis of websites and acquisition literature, and 
interviews with DOD contracting and small business 
specialists provided the basis for this study.  
It identifies acquisition reform legislation enacted 
in the 1990s that has had a direct impact on WOSBs and SDBs 
and examines the charge that the practice of contract 
bundling has negatively impacted the ability of small 
businesses to win DOD contracts. An analysis of contract 
bundling data from the Small Business Office of Advocacy, 
Congress and DOD demonstrates that the data is insufficient 
and inconsistent to prove or disprove that contract 
bundling is negatively impacting small businesses. However, 
DOD data for fiscal years 1992 through 2002 indicates that 
DOD contracting with WOSBs improved consistently, 
particularly after enactment of the Federal Acquisition 
Streamlining Act (FASA) of 1994, which mandated that the 
federal government, inclusive of DOD, award five percent of 
total yearly procurement dollars to WOSBs.  
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I. INTRODUCTION 
A.  BACKGROUND 
Small businesses represent as important part of our 
country’s industrial base and are therefore vital to our 
national economy.  Because over 50 percent of the American 
business base consists of small businesses (Ref. 1), the 
Department of Defense (DOD) is in a unique position to 
capitalize on the resources offered by these businesses. 
Beginning with the Armed Services Procurement Act of 
1947, federal laws were enacted to provide assistance to 
small businesses to help them obtain a “fair” portion of 
total federal purchases and contracts.  Congress chose this 
course of action because elected officials realized at that 
time that without legislation, large businesses would 
continue to win most of the government contracts over small 
businesses. (Ref. 2) 
In 1953, Congress passed the Small Business Act which 
established the Small Business Administration (SBA) as an 
independent agency within the Executive Branch of the 
government to further assist small businesses to win 
federal contracts.  This act required federal agencies to 
report procurement details to the Commerce Business Daily 
for procurements over the small business dollar threshold, 
and required new subcontracting clauses to be added to 
procurement contracts as well. 
According to the Small Business Act, the core of the 
American economic system of private enterprise is free 
competition.  The Act further states that this competition 
is basic not only to the economic health of the United 
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States but to its security as well.  Unless small business 
is encouraged and developed, the economic and security 
needs of the nation will not be fully realized. (Ref. 3) 
The federal government defines a small business 
concern as one which is independently owned and operated 
but does not dominate in its field of expertise. The number 
of employees and a yearly dollar volume apply to the 
government’s definition of a small business as well. A 
small women-owned business is one in which a woman owns 51 
percent of the business. A small disadvantaged business is 
one in which at least 51 percent of the business is owned 
by one or more socially and economically disadvantaged 
individuals. (Ref. 4) 
Small businesses have been participating in the DOD 
procurement world for many years. Each year the various 
departments of the federal government are assigned 
congressionally-mandated small business procurement goals.  
DOD’s congressionally-mandated yearly goal is to award at 
least 5 percent of all contracts to small businesses, 
including small disadvantaged businesses and women-owned 
small businesses.  DOD partners with the Small Business 
Administration (SBA) to meet these yearly small business 
goals. (Ref. 1) 
During the 1980's and 1990’s, federal and DOD 
procurement policies changed significantly. The most 
important of those changes resulted from the Competition in 
Contracting Act (1984), the 1993 National Performance 
Review, the Federal Acquisition Streamlining Act (1994), 
the Clinger-Cohen Act of 1996, also known as the Federal  
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Acquisition Reform Act, the 1997 Defense Management 
Initiative and the Federal Acquisition Regulation (FAR), 
Part 12, Commercial Acquisition, January 2002. 
These policy changes and acquisition reforms will be 
discussed in this thesis from the perspective of their 
impact on small women-owned businesses and small 
disadvantaged businesses. 
Research indicates that women-owned small businesses 
have not been receiving their fair share of DOD contracts.  
Fair share refers to the federally mandated DOD yearly goal 
of awarding five percent of all contracts to women-owned 
small businesses. (Ref. 5) In the year 2000, DOD awarded 
only two percent of all contracts to these types of 
businesses. (Ref. 6) 
There are certain barriers which may hinder small 
business participation in DOD procurement.  Acquisition 
reform has attempted to overcome some of these barriers, 
but some new barriers have appeared, most importantly, 
contract bundling.  Contract bundling involves organizing 
similar buys into one large contract which could exclude 
the small business contractor. 
However, assistance is available to help small 
business contractors compete for DOD contracts. The 
assistance programs will also be discussed in this thesis. 
In additions, the thesis will discuss how the 
contracting officer plays a pivotal role in this area by 
encouraging small business participation.  It is the 
contracting officer’s responsibility to ensure that small 
business laws and rules are adhered to within each 
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procurement. This role is vital in order to guarantee that 
small disadvantaged businesses as well as women-owned small 
businesses are given fair opportunities to win DOD 
contracts/subcontracts. 
B. OBJECTIVE 
The purpose of this thesis is to provide a detailed 
analysis of the effects of DOD acquisition reform on small 
disadvantaged businesses and small women-owned businesses 
since the 1990’s when major procurement changes began to 
impact DOD’s conduct of its procurement business. 
In addition, it will provide useful information to 
contracting officials to assist them in meeting their 
yearly contracting goals. 
In order to clarify the above issues, data gathered 
will address the following research questions: 
1. Primary Research Question 
What have been the specific effects of DOD acquisition 
reform on small disadvantaged businesses and women-owned 
small businesses? 
2. Subsidiary Research Questions 
• What are the most important reform initiatives 
DOD has undertaken since the 1990’s through 2002 
to improve acquisition? 
• What types of products and services do small 
businesses provide to DOD?  
• How many Small Disadvantaged and Women-Owned 
Small Businesses have contracts with DOD? 
• In what ways have these businesses been helped by 
acquisition reform? 
• What are the barriers that prevent these types of 
businesses from obtaining DOD contracts? 
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• What assistance currently exists to help small 
businesses to compete for DOD contracts either 
directly as a prime contractor or as a 
subcontractor.  
• What is the role of the Small Business 
Administration in assisting small businesses to 
win DOD contracts? 
• What is the role of the contracting officer in 
this arena? 
C.  SCOPE 
The scope of this thesis will focus on the following 
topics: 
• The effects of acquisition reform on businesses 
since the mid 1990’s. 
• The history of the SBA/DOD partnership in small 
business DOD procurement. 
• Women-owned and small disadvantaged businesses 
contracting with DOD. 
• The barriers preventing small businesses from 
participating in DOD contracts. 
• The assistance in place to help small businesses 
obtain government contracts. 
• The key role played by the DOD contracting 
officer and small business specialist in this 
arena. 
D.  METHODOLOGY 
The methodology followed for this thesis consists of 
the following: 
• A search of acquisition related web sites. 
• Research of the literature available in the form 
of books, journal articles and other library 
information sources. 
• Query home command, Headquarters, United States 
Army Communications-Electronics Command (CECOM), 
regional small business office, DOD small 
business office as well as contracting officers 
for their input and feedback. 
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• Identify specific acquisition reform policies and 
their effects on small businesses. 
• Identify specific barriers preventing small 
disadvantaged and women-owned small business 
participation in DOD procurements. 
• Identify specific assistance in place to help 
small businesses obtain DOD contracts. 
E.  ORGANIZATION OF THE STUDY 
The research results will be presented in five 
chapters. The first chapter will discuss the background and 
provide a framework for this research. Chapter II will 
present the role of small business in meeting DOD mission 
requirements, focusing on the 1990s through 2002. Chapter 
III will discuss acquisition reform in depth as it relates 
to the small businesses discussed in this thesis. Chapter 
IV will present a statistical analysis of possible 
acquisition reform effects on small disadvantaged 
businesses and women-owned small businesses contracting 
with DOD. Chapter IV will also discuss the roles of the DOD 
contracting officers in the small business procurement 
arena. Finally, Chapter V will provide answers to the 
research questions identified in Paragraph B., and present 




II. ROLE OF SMALL BUSINESSES IN MEETING DOD MISSION 
REQUIREMENTS 
A.  INTRODUCTION 
The purpose of this chapter is to identify the role 
that small businesses play in the Department of Defense’s 
missions and national defense strategy.  
B.  REVOLUTION IN MILITARY AFFAIRS 
The mission of the Defense Department is to protect 
America and her allies against her enemies both foreign and 
domestic. The early 1980’s saw a massive build up of the 
Defense Department, resulting in a large infrastructure 
established to support the warfighter. In the latter part 
of the twentieth century, DOD’s strategy was to structure 
the armed forces in such a way as to be able to fight two 
major theater wars nearly simultaneously, and to be able to 
undertake several operations other than war as well. This 
force structure was appropriate in the Cold War era.   
However, when the Soviet Union collapsed, this force 
structure was no longer appropriate. As a result of the end 
of the Cold War in the late 1980’s, an era of major 
cutbacks of the defense budget began. At the same time, and 
largely driven by advances in information technology, DOD 
began a “revolution in military affairs” in order to 
capitalize on the advances in technology for use in the 
battlefield in a more affordable manner. The revolution, 
now termed “transformation,” has continued into the 21st 
Century and is producing fundamental changes in operational 
concepts, doctrine and force structure. (Ref. 7) 
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Some of the goals of this transformation are:  
• to continue to expand acquisition reform to buy 
goods and services more efficiently in order to 
reduce the time it takes to deliver these goods 
and services to the warfighter;  
• to work with the General Accounting Office (GAO) 
and the Defense Contract Audit Agency (DCAA) to 
eliminate or minimize auditing and accounting 
procedures in order to ease the civil-military 
integration of the nation’s industrial base; 
• to reduce the size and cost of DOD infrastructure  
through the use of best commercial practices and 
base closure and realignment; and, 
• to privatize those support areas that are not 
“inherently governmental.” Inherently 
governmental is a term applied to those functions 
that require the exercise of personal judgment 
and discretion on the part of a Government 
official and cannot be performed by private 
industry. (Ref. 8) 
According to Donald Rumsfeld, current Secretary of 
Defense, the military’s mission in the 21st Century is a 
very complex and difficult one.  In a speech given to 
students at the National Defense University, Rumsfeld 
noted: 
Our challenge in this new century is a difficult 
one. It’s really to prepare to defend our nation 
against the unknown, the uncertain and what we 
have to understand will be the unexpected.  That 
may seem on the face of it an impossible task, 
but it is not.  But to accomplish it, we have to 
put aside the comfortable ways of thinking and 
planning, take risks and try new things so that 
we can prepare our forces to deter and defeat 
adversaries that have not yet emerged to 
challenge us. Well before September 11th, the 
senior civilian and military leaders of the 
Department of Defense were in the process of 
doing just that. With the Quadrennial Defense 
Review, we took a long, hard look at the emerging 
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security environment and we came to the 
conclusion that a new defense strategy was 
appropriate.  We decided to move away from the 
“two major theater war” construct for sizing our 
forces, an approach that called for maintaining 
two massive occupation forces capable of marching 
on and occupying capitals of two aggressors at 
the same time and changing their regimes.  This 
approach served us well in the immediate post-
Cold War period, but it really threatened to 
leave us reasonably prepared for two specific 
conflicts and under-prepared for the unexpected 
contingencies of the 21st century. (Ref. 9) 
During the same speech, the Secretary emphasized that 
due to the fact that the United States is an open society, 
it is very vulnerable to terrorist attacks as proven by 
September 11, 2001. These terrorist attacks can also damage 
America’s space assets and information networks; therefore, 
America needs to continue to develop effective means to 
defend against cyberspace attacks. He stated that DOD’s 
transformation strategy includes the following six major 
goals: 
• Protect the U.S. homeland and our bases overseas; 
• Project and sustain power in distant theaters; 
• Deny sanctuary to enemies so that they know that 
no corner of the world is remote enough to 
protect them from  U.S. reach; 
• Protect information networks from attack; 
• Use information technology to link U.S. troops to 
be able to fight jointly; and, 
• Maintain access to space and protect space 
abilities from enemy attack. 
The expected result is to be able to rapidly deploy 
joint forces over long distances ensuring all services are  
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working together with air, land and sea capabilities in 
order to be able to strike quickly with devastating 
results.  
As a direct response to the events of September 11, 
2001, the Northern Command in the United States was 
established on October 1, 2002 at Peterson Air Force Base 
in Colorado.  This new command will assist the new Homeland 
Security Department to protect, respond and defend against 
threats to the territorial United States. (Ref. 10) 
Another goal of the military’s strategy for the 21st 
Century is not just to fight wars, but also to prevent them 
from ever happening in the first place.  In support of that 
goal, DOD intends to deploy an effective missile defense 
within the continental United States to work as a deterrent 
to other nations who may think of developing missiles to 
use against America.  
This will require a balancing of existing forces and 
capabilities by developing a defense arsenal of manned and 
unmanned vehicles, short and long-range systems, stealthy 
and non-stealthy systems. In addition, DOD will continue to 
expand into the information age to capitalize on cutting 
edge technology. 
The Quadrennial Defense Review held in 2001 shifted 
defense planning from the “threat-based” model of the past 
to a “capabilities-based” model for the future. The future 
model focuses on how an enemy might fight rather than whom 
that enemy might be or where a war might happen. This 
paradigm shift will prepare the United States to deter and 
defeat adversaries who will use the element of surprise, 
deception, and asymmetric warfare to achieve their 
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objectives. The new focus will also require the military to 
adapt its existing capabilities to new circumstances, while 
experimenting with the development of new capabilities. The 
senior civilian and military leadership of the DOD 
participated in the review. Donald Rumsfeld, the key 
motivator of the military transformation, stated the 
following regarding defense in the 21st century in the 
current QDR report:  
Transforming America’s defense for the 21st 
century will require a long-standing commitment 
from our country and its leaders.  Transformation 
is not a goal for tomorrow, but an endeavor that 
must be embraced in earnest today.  The 
challenges the Nation faces do not loom in the 
distant future, but are here  now. They involve 
protecting our critical bases of operation – 
including the most critical base of operation, 
the U.S. homeland- and projecting and sustaining 
U.S. forces in distant anti-access environments. 
They entail assuring U.S. information systems and 
providing persistent surveillance, tracking, and 
rapid engagement of adversary forces and 
capabilities.  They require enhancing the 
capability and survivability of U.S. space 
systems and leveraging information technology and 
new concepts to provide for more effective joint 
operations. (Ref. 11) 
C.  THE ROLE OF SMALL BUSINESS IN DOD’S MISSIONS 
Small businesses are very involved in providing many 
services in support of defense. For example, after the 
September 11, 2001 events, DOD relied heavily on small 
businesses to provide the “critical surge capacity” 
required to rebuild the Pentagon. Forty-three percent of 
the Pentagon renovation prime contractors are small 
businesses.  These businesses, ranging in size and varying 
in trade, provided shifts of employees working around the 
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clock, seven days a week to restore 300,000 square feet of 
office space so that 1,500 of 4,600 displaced DOD staff 
could return as quickly as possible to a fully operational 
workplace. (Ref. 12) 
One month after the Pentagon attack, the Secretary of 
Defense issued a Broad Agency Announcement (BAA) requesting 
companies and educational institutes to propose concepts to 
combat terrorism that could be converted into a product 
that could be fielded within 18 months.  More than 12,500 
concepts evolved as a result of the BAA process. Concepts 
included methods to destroy difficult targets, conduct 
operations in remote areas and to deploy effective 
countermeasures in order to destroy weapons of mass 
destruction. Women, minority and veteran owned small 
businesses were well represented among the proposals 
selected for further evaluation. (Ref. 12) 
Small businesses represent over 50 percent of 
America’s Gross Domestic Product (GDP). (Ref. 13) Examples 
of the types of products and services they have provided to 
DOD over the last twenty years include computer equipment, 
software, communications services, educational services, 
Internet website development, hazardous waste removal, 
accounting and management support services, fire and 
security systems, information management technologies, 
software training, network design and support, facilities 
management services, systems integration, and engineering 
services. They have also provided computer engineering 
services, Research and Development services, computer test 
and evaluation services as well as facility services and 
custodial services. (Ref. 14) 
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The following significant examples of small business’ 
accomplishments in supporting DOD’s mission over the years 
provide proof of how important these businesses are to 
defense of the country. For example, Foam Matrix, an ISO 
9000 certified small business located in Inglewood, 
California, was founded as a surfboard company. (ISO 9000 
is the International Organization for Standardization for 
Quality Management Systems). While perfecting surfboards, 
the company founder developed a strong, ultra-light, 
repairable composite foam. This product turned out to have 
military application. The foam is now the main component in 
the replacement wings of the X-45 unmanned combat air 
vehicle.  Because of this success, Foam Matrix will be 
producing replacement parts for the C-17 military transport 
plane. (Ref. 12)  
A group of small businesses teamed together to 
resurrect the Army’s Land Warrior program after a large 
business prime contractor was unable to complete the 
program.  The original prototype was so large that if a 
soldier had to drop to the ground and roll, he could get 
stuck on his back because of the weight of the system.  
Pacific Consultants, Exponent, Pemstar, Computer 
Sciences and Omega worked together, and in a matter of 
months and at half the price designed a prototype of the 
system that now weighs 12.75 pounds, a small fraction of 
its original weight.  These companies redesigned software 
so that it would migrate from complex military code to 
Microsoft 2000 software.  As a result, any soldier who grew 
up with computers can use the new system without extensive 
training. (Ref. 12) 
 14
In 1996 a woman-owned small business, SAB construction 
of Cameron Park, California won a construction contract at 
Nellis Air Force Base for one million dollars.  The company 
completed the job within the one-year contractual timeframe 
and received an outstanding evaluation of their performance 
by their customer. (Ref. 15) 
In addition to the above, small businesses provide DOD 
with logistics and acquisition management support in the 
areas of reliability and maintainability of weapon systems 
as well as technical documentation. In 2000, the Naval Air 
Systems Command (NAVAIR) awarded the largest Section 8(a) 
competitive award in the history of the 8(a) program.  The 
contract was awarded to “TeamQualtec,” which consists of 
the team of 8(a) firms Qualtec, Inc. of Beltsville, MD and 
CCI, Inc. of Alexandria, VA. (The Small Business 
Administration (SBA) 8(a) Program is a program that allows 
the government to award prime contracts to socially and 
economically disadvantaged owners whose firm is certified 
under the SBA’s 8(a) Program. (Section 8(a) refers to 
Section 8(a) of the Small Business Act). (Ref. 17) The 
contract awarded is an indefinite delivery, indefinite 
quantity (IDIQ) type for technical and management logistics 
services in support of NAVAIR’s Headquarters office and 
field activities for a ten-year period of performance.  The 
cumulative dollar value of the contract is expected to be 
approximately $698.5 million over its life. (Ref. 16)  
In 2001, Kelly Logistics Support Systems, a woman-
owned small business, provided Wright Patterson Air Force 
Base’s research laboratory with a desktop simulator using 
commercial equipment.  The system simulated theater level 
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operations with a word-spotting algorithm, which 
significantly improved user acceptance of voice recognition 
technologies for flight line maintenance applications. 
(Ref. 18) 
On February 16, 2001, the Defense Information Systems 
Agency (DISA) awarded the largest small business set-aside 
in history.  The award involved three IDIQ contracts for 
Defense Information Systems Network (DISN) Satellite 
Transmission Services-Global (DSTS-G).  Through these 
contracts, the government will receive a government-wide 
global fixed satellite service bandwidth along with related 
business, enterprise satellite-based services and software 
applications.  The awardees are Artel, Inc., a small 
disadvantaged business; Spacelink International LLC, a 
small business; and Arrowhead Space & Telecommunications, 
Inc., a woman-owned small disadvantaged business.  The set-
up of these contracts is such that these three contractors 
will compete for the work on an individual task order 
basis.  Each contract was awarded for a base period of 
three years with seven one-year options.  The cumulative 
maximum face value of the combined contracts is expected to 
be $2.196 billion. (Ref. 16) 
Women-owned small businesses participate in all 
domestic industries.  Compared with men, women have lower 
shares of firms in construction, finance, insurance and 
real estate. However, women have a higher share in the 
service industries. (Ref. 19) As of calendar year 2000, 
there were 141 million Americans in the labor force with 
almost 10 million who were self-employed.  Women’s shares  
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of the labor force and of self-employment increased from 
40.54 percent and 22.37 percent in 1976 to 46.38 percent 
and 37.88 percent in 2000, respectively. (Ref. 20) 
Each year before Congress, DOD pledges to strive to 
enhance its overall small business performance, in order to 
achieve the recently established goals for woman-owned 
small businesses, and Historically Underutilized Business 
Zones (HUBZones). In Fiscal Year 2001, DOD awarded $51.8 
billion in procurement contracts to small business firms, 
of which $28.3 billion was awarded to small business prime 
contractors.  This was the first time in the history of the 
DOD Small Business Procurement Program that the program 
surpassed the $50 billion threshold. (Ref. 12)   
  In FY 2001 the number of DOD contracts awarded to 
small businesses increased by 8.2 percent over FY 2000 to 
1,825. Of these, 584 were women-owned and 355 were located 
in HUBZones. In 2002, according to the Deputy Under 
Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Logistics and 
Technology, E. C. “Pete” Aldridge, 88 percent of DOD 
contractors are small businesses. (Ref. 12) 
D.  DOD ACQUISITION AND PROCUREMENT IN THE 21ST CENTURY  
When the Soviet threat fell apart and the cold war 
ended, the direct effect was a steady decline of funding, 
forcing DOD to deal with unprecedented change. From the 
mid-1980’s through the latter part of the 1990’s, DOD 
experienced significant budget cuts.  As a direct result, 
several rounds of Base Realignment and Closure Commissions 
(BRAC’s) in 1988, 1991, 1993, and 1995 resulted in the 
closure of a significant number of domestic bases. In 
addition, the acquisition workforce was reduced by 
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approximately 50 percent, from 460,516 in 1990 to 230,556 
employees in 1999. From Fiscal Year 1990 to Fiscal Year 
1999, DOD procurement values decreased from approximately 
144.7 billion dollars to about 139.8 billion dollars.  
However, workload increased by roughly 12 percent and the 
number of procurement actions increased from around 13.2 
million to about 14.8 million. (Ref. 21) 
All of these factors have had a substantial impact on 
the way that DOD has had to adapt its acquisition and 
procurement practices and policies in response to the known 
and unknown threats of the 21st Century. Although real 
defense spending has grown every year since 1998, and 
procurement is way up, the methods DOD uses to buy goods 
and services and weapon systems are not likely to return to 
those of pre-Cold War days because of numerous process 
innovations brought about by acquisition reforms and 
workforce downsizing. 
The business processes in this century used by DOD to 
buy goods and services are transforming along with the 
military through the use of more efficient business 
practices, electronic commerce, and increased focus on 
strengthening the industrial base. 
As stated previously, small businesses, including 
women-owned and small disadvantaged businesses, are very 
involved with both DOD acquisition and procurement. There 
have been numerous acquisition reforms enacted over the 
years to improve the way that DOD and the rest of the 
Federal Government buys its goods and services. Some of 
these businesses may have been affected by those reforms. 
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Chapter III will discuss some major acquisition 
reforms resulting from the revolution in military affairs, 
and their impact on small women-owned and small 
disadvantaged businesses.  
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III. ACQUISITION REFORM 
A. INTRODUCTION 
The purpose of this chapter is to discuss DOD 
acquisition reform and associated legislation, with 
particular focus on the reform laws that have directly 
affected WOSB's and SDB's. 
B. BACKGROUND 
As a result of the Cold War with the Soviet Union 
ending in the late 1980's, DOD saw its budget reduced 42 
percent from that point in time through 1997. (Ref. 22) Due 
to the drastic budget decline, DOD had no choice but to 
become more efficient in buying its goods and services 
through streamlining and innovation. (Ref. 23) At the same 
time as the Cold War was ending, Congress also wanted the 
acquisition workforce to become better educated and 
proficient in order to manage acquisition reform. (Ref. 24) 
In reviewing available data on acquisition reform, 
this researcher chose first to define what is currently 
accepted as DOD acquisition reform, and then to identify 
the factors that led to reform in the 1990s. In addition, 
this chapter provides a synopsis of the reform laws enacted 
in the 1990s, with a particular focus on those laws that 
Congress and the SBA Office of Advocacy say have had a 
direct impact on small businesses, including WOSBs and 
SDBs.   
C.  DOD ACQUISITION REFORM 
The Defense Systems Management College (DSMC) defines 
DOD acquisition reform as: 
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an endeavor to make the acquisition process more 
effective, efficient, and productive. It involves 
reducing overhead, streamlining requirements, 
speeding up processes, cutting paperwork and 
other similar initiatives to reduce bureaucracy.  
Acquisition reform includes a move toward the use 
of commercial practices as well as the use of 
private enterprise to do more of the functions 
traditionally done by government. (Ref. 25) 
D.   FACTORS LEADING TO ACQUISITION REFORM 
Factors that led to DOD acquisition reform and 
associated legislation included a significant budget 
decline starting in the late 1980s, "The Section 800 Panel 
Report of 1993", "The National Performance Review of 
1993"," and Dr. William Perry's 1994 "Acquisition Reform - 
A Mandate For Change."(Ref. 26) 
1.  DOD Budget Decline 
As stated previously, as a result of the end of the 
Cold War with the Soviet Union, the DOD budget declined 
steadily from the late 1980s through 1997. (Ref. 22) Lack 
of resources encouraged DOD to develop initiatives to 
improve its buying practices.  
2.  Section 800 Panel Report 
In addition to the budget decline, Congress began 
increasingly to focus on the acquisition practices DOD 
followed to buy its goods and services in the late 1980's 
and the 1990's. Consequently, Section 800 of the National 
Defense Authorization Act of 1990 directed DOD to convene a 
panel of government, industry and academic representatives. 
(Ref. 26) The panel's purpose was to review and provide 
recommendations for changes to acquisition laws pertaining 
to DOD buying practices to improve and simplify those 
procedures. The result was "The Section 800 Panel Report," 
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published in 1993. The report identified over 600 statutes 
and approximately 300 laws that should be repealed or 
changed to allow DOD to buy its goods and services more 
efficiently at a lower cost (Ref. 26). 
3. National Performance Review 
Concurrently with the Section 800 panel report, Vice 
President Albert Gore completed his National Performance 
Review in September 1993. The report contained similar 
recommendations for DOD acquisition improvements. It stated 
that DOD's acquisition processes and practices were based 
on "rigid rules and procedures, extensive paperwork, 
detailed design specifications, and multiple inspections 
and audits." (Ref. 27) As a result of these practices, a 
costly DOD procurement bureaucracy developed which caused 
manufacturers to include the cost of contending with the 
bureaucracy within the prices they charged. (Ref. 27) 
Consequently, the Vice President recommended that the 
government streamline the acquisition system by rewriting 
the Federal Acquisition Regulation (FAR). (Ref. 26)  
4.  Dr. Perry’s Acquisition Mandate for Change 
Dr. William Perry, Secretary of Defense in the early 
to mid 1990s, published his acquisition vision in 
"Acquisition Reform - A Mandate for Change" in 1994. His 
mandate was based on the aforementioned reports and on his 
vision for how DOD should implement procurement reform. 
(Ref. 28)  
Dr. Perry justified the need for DOD acquisition 
reform on the basis of the declining defense business, a 
decline that caused numerous defense company mergers and  
 22
acquisitions (Ref. 28). The result was that DOD could no 
longer rely on a unique defense industrial base to buy its 
goods and services (Ref. 28) 
Secretary Perry’s buying philosophy focused on three 
distinct areas: the establishment of a combined 
defense/commercial national industrial base in lieu of a 
separate defense industrial base, the abandonment of 
military unique specification (MILSPECs) requirements, and 
the need for DOD to rely more heavily on the commercial 
marketplace to buy its goods and services. (Ref. 28)  
Dr. Perry also focused on the small business 
contractor.  He felt DOD purchases from the commercial 
marketplace would facilitate the participation of small 
business in the defense business.  He believed that the 
defense business decline resulted in fewer and fewer prime 
contractors with whom small businesses could subcontract. 
The small business contractor would therefore have to 
assume the dual cost of additional overhead and performance 
and unnecessary MILSPECs in order to contract with DOD 
(Ref. 28). 
E.  1990S ACQUISITION REFORM LEGISLATION 
The most important acquisition reform laws enacted 
during the 1990s were The Defense Acquisition Workforce 
Improvement Act of 1991 (DAWIA), The Federal Acquisition 
Streamlining Act of 1994 (FASA), The Information Technology 
Management Reform Act of 1995 (IFTMRA), The Federal 
Acquisition Reform Act (FARA) of 1995, and The Federal 
Activities Inventory Reform Act (FAIRA) of 1998. 
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1.  Defense Acquisition Workforce Improvement Act 
(DAWIA) 
DAWIA specifically supported the intent of Congress to 
have a better-trained and educated acquisition workforce. 
(Ref. 24) The law identified positions in career fields 
such as auditing, business, cost estimating, financial 
management, contracting, facilities engineering management, 
information technology, weapon system life cycle logistics, 
production, quality and manufacturing, program management, 
purchasing, systems planning, research, development and 
engineering, and test and evaluation to be acquisition 
positions. It established an acquisition corps and the 
requirement for DOD to train and certify acquisition 
personnel within a tri-level system that included mandatory 
educational requirements at each level.  In addition, it 
set a yearly mandatory requirement for acquisition 
personnel to obtain 40 hours of acquisition training. (Ref. 
24) As a result of DAWIA, all acquisition positions now 
require certification.  For example, a contracting officer 
position, job series 1102, requires Level III certification 
in Contracting. (Ref. 24) This law was selected for study 
because of its contribution to the professionalization of 
the DOD acquisition workforce. 
2.  The Federal Acquisition Streamlining Act (FASA) 
FASA fundamentally changed the way that the 
government, including DOD, buys its products. (Ref. 29) It 
did this by promoting the acquisition of commercial items 
for DOD to meet its needs instead of military specification 
unique items. (Ref. 29) 
The simplified acquisition threshold level for 
awarding contracts to small businesses was elevated to from 
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$25,000 to $100,000. This is significant for small 
businesses because items bought under the simplified 
acquisition threshold between $2,500 and $100,000 must now 
be set aside for a small business. The only exception to 
this law would be if the contracting officer could not 
locate a suitable small business to perform a specific 
contractual effort. (Ref. 29) 
As a consequence of FASA, micro-purchases below $2,500 
are no longer restricted to small businesses or subject to 
the rules of the Buy American Act. Prior to this 
legislation, only small businesses and American businesses 
could be utilized for small purchases.  This led to the 
establishment and use of the government purchase card. The 
government-wide purchase card is now used for micro-
purchases without the use of full and open competition. 
(Ref. 29) Formerly, all purchases up to the dollar 
threshold of $25,000 were reserved for small businesses. 
Another important aspect of FASA is that for the first 
time in acquisition history, the law set a yearly goal of 
five percent of all procurement dollars to be awarded to 
WOSB’s. (Ref. 29) Although this goal is mandated in law, 
DOD has yet to meet the yearly WOSB goal. (Ref. 29) 
Finally, FASA ushered in the new era of electronic 
commerce to lower the cost of DOD procurement by reducing 
procurement cycle time for product delivery and by 
eliminating excessive paperwork. (Ref. 29) This law was 
selected for study because of the fundamental changes in 
DOD procurement resulting from its enactment. 
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3.  Information Technology Management Reform Act 
(ITMRA) 
ITMRA became a part of the Clinger-Cohen Act of 1996, 
which was then incorporated into the Federal Acquisition 
Reform Act (FARA). It shifted responsibility for 
Information Technology (IT) acquisition responsibility from 
the General Services Administration (GSA) to the Director, 
Office of Management and Budget (OMB). The intent of this 
law was to streamline IT acquisition and to emphasize life 
cycle management of IT as a capital investment. Most 
significantly for the commercial world, ITMRA encouraged 
the incremental purchasing of Commercial Off the Shelf 
(COTS) products instead of government unique products. 
(Ref. 30) This law was selected for study because of its 
potential to increase opportunities for small businesses to 
compete for DOD contracts. 
4.  Federal Acquisition Reform ACT (FARA) 
FARA, also known as the Clinger-Cohen Act, 
incorporated ITMRA and introduced the term “efficient 
competition" into the acquisition arena. (Ref. 31) What 
this means is that the standard for full and open 
competition resulting from the Competition in Contracting 
Act (CICA) of 1984 could be modified by "the use of 
procurement methods consistent with efficiency to fulfill 
the government's requirements in the most effective 
manner." (Ref. 31) In other words, similar contracting 
efforts could be combined for efficiency's sake. This law 
was selected for study because of the resultant changes in 
buying practices and policies; practices and policies which 
began to affect small businesses in the mid 1990s. (Ref. 
32) 
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5.  Federal Activities Inventory Reform Act of 1998 
(FAIRA) 
FAIRA requires all federal agencies to submit an 
annual list of those activities performed by federal 
employees that could be performed by private industry to 
the Director of the Office of Management and Budget. 
Subsequently, certain functions performed by federal 
workers can be contracted out to private firms.  However, 
the law dictates that each time an executive agency head 
considers contracting with the private sector for an 
activity on the inventory list, competitive procedures must 
be followed. (Ref. 33) This law was selected for study 
because of its potential for moving many federal jobs from 
the public domain to private industry, which could increase 
contracting opportunities for small businesses. 
F.  THE IMPACT OF ACQUISITION REFORM ON SMALL BUSINESS 
A review of empirical data indicates that the 
acquisition reform laws having the most significant impact 
on WOSB’s and SDB’s are (FASA) and FARA/Clinger-Cohen Act. 
(Ref. 34) Therefore, for purposes of this thesis, the focus 
will be on these two reform measures. According to the SBA 
Office of Advocacy and Congress, these bills have directly 
impacted small businesses, including WOSB’s and SDB’s, by 
limiting the ability of such businesses to compete for 
federal contracts. (Ref. 34) 
The key to the impact of these two laws on small 
businesses inclusive of WOSBs and SDBs are the "by-product 
practices"(Ref. 34), including contract bundling and 
increased use of Multiple Award Schedules, Federal Supply 
Schedules and Government-Wide Acquisition Contracts 
(GWACs). (Ref. 34) 
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1.  Contract Bundling 
The Small Business Act defines contract bundling as 
the combination of two or more contracts previously 
available to small businesses that, because of the bundling 
practice, are no longer available. (Ref. 3) The combination 
of contracts makes the contract too large for bidding by 
small businesses, including WOSBs and SDBs. (Ref. 34) 
The SBA Office of Advocacy claims that the ability of 
small businesses to remain a vital part of America's 
economy has steadily declined due to contract bundling. 
(Ref. 34) Chapter IV will provide an analysis of the impact 
of contract bundling on DOD WOSBs and SDBs.  
2.  Multiple Award Schedule (MAS) 
A Multiple Award Schedule is an Indefinite Delivery 
Indefinite Quantity (IDIQ) type of contract controlled by 
the General Services Administration (GSA).  DOD utilizes 
these contracts to place orders for commonly required 
commercial supplies and services from one vendor or from 
multiple vendors. For recurring requirements, DOD utilizes 
a specific MAS to award a Blanket Purchase Agreement (BPA) 
to a sole vendor. By using the BPA method for commercial 
supplies and services, DOD capitalizes on quantity 
discounts as well as reducing paperwork and procurement 
cycle time. (Ref. 35) 
MASs have impacted the ability of small businesses to 
compete for federal contracts because some of these BPAs 
are so large in volume and dollar value.  (Ref. 34) 
3.  Federal Supply Schedules  
Federal Supply Schedules are a series of General 
Services Administration (GSA) schedules of supplies and 
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services commonly used by the Government at specified 
prices. Using competitive practices, contracting officers 
award Indefinite Delivery, Indefinite Quantity (IDIQ) 
contracts to commercial firms requiring the firms to 
provide the specified supplies and services under 
“schedule” at stated prices for given periods of time.  
(Ref. 34) These contracts become so large that the small 
business contractor is unable to handle the dollar volume 
of the IDIQ's and therefore is unable to compete. (Ref. 34) 
4.  Government-Wide Agency Contracts (GWACS) 
Government-Wide Agency Contracts are multi-agency 
contracts for various information technology resources that 
other specified federal agencies can use. The host agency 
charges the other participating agencies a nominal fee. 
These multi-agency contracts permit the aggregation of 
agency demand to encourage vendors to offer the best 
possible prices, while reducing the overhead associated 
with multiple acquisitions. (Ref. 34) GWACs tend to become 
so large that the small business contractor once again is 
often prevented from competing for any of the work 
contracted for under a GWAC. (Ref. 34) 
G.  IMPACT OF CONTRACT BUNDLING ON WOSBS AND SDBS 
According to the SBA's Office of Advocacy, MAS's and 
GWACs are normally so large in scope that small businesses 
are unable to compete. (Ref. 34) In addition, these 
procurement tools are making it more difficult for small 
businesses to increase capacity and capabilities because 
the smaller contracts that traditionally allowed them to 
gain access into the Federal market are no longer 
available. (Ref. 34) 
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The SBA Advocacy Office believes that the use of the 
Federal Supply Schedule has also hurt small businesses, 
because even though the Small Business Act and FASA require 
goods or services purchases between $2,500 and $100,000 to 
be reserved for small businesses, the Federal Supply  
Schedule (FSS) overseen by the General Services 
Administration does not restrict FSS contracts to small 
businesses. (Ref. 34) 
On June 20, 2001 Susan M. Walthall, the Acting Chief 
Counsel for the SBA Office of Advocacy, provided the House 
Committee on Small Business the following testimony: 
"Federal procurement policy issues such as contract 
bundling, Federal Supply Schedules, Government-Wide 
Acquisition contracts and agency downsizing of the 
acquisition work force impact DOD's ability to meet its 
goals, and as a result small businesses are facing 
roadblocks throughout the Federal Government." (Ref. 34) 
Ms. Walthall further stated, "Since its establishment, 
the Office of Advocacy has been actively engaged in the 
analysis of Federal procurement policy and its impact on 
the small business community.  A primary concern in recent 
years has been whether the top-to-bottom Federal 
acquisition reform of the mid-1990's in the form of the 
Federal Acquisition Streamlining Act of 1994  
(FASA), the Clinger-Cohen Act of 1996 and the Federal 
Acquisition Reform Act of 1996 (FARA) has helped or 
hindered the Federal Government in achieving its mission as 
cited in the 1953 Small Business Act and subsequent 
amendments to this national policy statement." (Ref. 34) 
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According to SBA Office of Advocacy records, small 
businesses received a little over thirty-eight percent of 
the $10.2 billion spent in FY 2000 on the FSS. Before 
procurement reform, small purchases of less than $25,000.00  
were mainly reserved for small business awards, and they 
received close to seventy-five percent of the dollars. 
(Ref. 34) 
The House Small Business Committee accuses federal 
agencies, including DOD, of consolidating contracts, making 
them so large that small businesses cannot compete for 
them. (Ref. 35) The Committee further states that the 
development of these "mega-contracts"(meaning bundled 
contracts, MAC's, FSS’s, and GWAC's) are a direct outgrowth 
of the Federal Acquisition Streamlining Act (FASA) of 1994, 
and the Federal Acquisition Reform Act, passed in 1996. 
(Ref. 35)  
As a result, members of Congress believe that 
government agencies have systematically and unfairly cut 
small businesses out of work for the federal government 
since the enactment of contract streamlining legislation, 
without securing the cost savings envisioned. (Ref. 35) 
However, according to Deirdre Lee, current director of 
Defense Procurement and Acquisition Policy in the Office of 
the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology 
and Logistics, small business DOD prime contractors have 
increased, not decreased.  For example, in FY 2002, the 
number of small business prime contractors performing on 
DOD contracts increased by 9,806, from 24,130 in FY 2001 to 
33,936 in FY 2002. (Ref. 36) In addition, DOD awarded $59 
billion to small businesses in FY 2002. (Ref. 36) Ms. Lee 
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further noted that DOD dollars awarded to WOSB’s and SDB’s 
also increased significantly at the prime and subcontract 
level in FY 2002. (Ref. 36) 
H.  CHAPTER SUMMARY 
This chapter identified critical acquisition reform 
measures and the potential impact of this legislation on 
WOSBs and SDBS. It also summarized the evidence of that 
impact, as provided by SBA Office of Advocacy and Congress.  
The practice of contract bundling resulting from 
acquisition reform was singled out for special criticism. 
(Ref. 34) and (Ref. 36) 
However, DOD currently indicates that acquisition 
reform has had a positive effect on small businesses, 
including WOSBs and SDBs, as indicated by the increase in 
DOD small business contractors. (Ref. 37) 
The following chapter will present a detailed analysis 
of the data presented in this chapter regarding the effects 
of acquisition reform on DOD WOSBs and SDBs. In addition, 
it will provide an analysis of the data discrepancies 






















THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK  
 33
IV. ANALYSIS OF THE EFFECTS OF DOD ACQUISITION 
REFORM ON WOSBS AND SDBS 
A.  INTRODUCTION 
This chapter presents an analysis of the effects of 
acquisition reform on WOSBs and SDBs contracting with DOD 
in the 1990s, and 2000 through 2002. The chapter includes a 
discussion of the SBA Office of Advocacy, Congress and DOD 
perspectives regarding those effects.  
B.  BACKGROUND 
The researcher chose fiscal years 1992 through 2002 
for study. This timeframe was chosen because practices such 
as contract bundling began in the early 1990s and 
accelerated after the enactment of both FASA (1994) and 
FARA (1996). (Ref. 34) Contract bundling, a by-product of 
acquisition reform, has had a negative impact on the 
ability of small businesses to compete for federal 
contracts. (Ref. 35)  
DOD's opinion regarding the impact of acquisition 
reform and contract bundling on small businesses, inclusive 
of SDBs and WOSBs, differs from that of the SBA and 
Congress. In fact, DOD believes that acquisition reform has 
helped the small business contractor, particularly WOSBs. 
(Ref. 36) 
This chapter reviews the perspectives of these three 
organizations regarding the effects of acquisition reform 
on small businesses, inclusive of WOSBs and SDBs.  In order 
to accomplish this, the researcher analyzed DOD small 
business procurement data for fiscal years 1992 through 
2002 from three aspects.  
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First, the analysis determined the percentage of DOD's 
total procurement prime contract dollars WOSBs and SDBs 
received during those years, and how that percentage 
corresponded to the congressionally-mandated yearly small 
business procurement goals.   
Secondly, the analysis attempted to determine whether 
or not a direct statistical link could be identified to 
clearly determine either a positive or negative impact on 
these businesses resulting from acquisition reform and 
contract bundling. 
Finally, the chapter analysis examined DOD prime 
contract dollars awarded to WOSBs and SDBs during the 
thesis timeframe. This is important because the data from 
Congress and the SBA Office of Advocacy contained only 
prime contract dollars awarded to small businesses. (Ref. 
34) and (Ref. 35) Therefore, DOD subcontracting dollars 
awarded during the same timeframe to WOSBs and SDBs were 
not examined for this thesis. 
C.  SOURCES OF DATA 
The data analyzed in this chapter originated from the 
SBA Office of Advocacy records, as well as congressional 
and DOD records applicable to DOD small business 
procurements for fiscal years 1992 through 2002. The 
majority of the data originated from the Federal 
Procurement Data System (FPDS). 
1. The Federal Procurement Data System (FPDS) 
Established in 1978, the FPDS is the government's 
centralized data center that "collects, processes and 
disseminates official statistical data on Federal 
contracting." (Ref. 37) The Office of Management and Budget 
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(OMB), Congress, the General Accounting Office (GAO), 
federal executive agencies and the general public use this 
database to develop recurring procurement reports as well 
as special reports. (Ref. 37) The FPDS database also 
contains consolidated procurement information by fiscal 
year regarding small businesses, inclusive of WOSBs and 
SDBs. The Federal Procurement Data Center (FPDC), an 
organization within the General Services Administration 
(GSA), manages the FPDS database. (Ref. 37) 
2. SBA Office of Advocacy Data Sources 
The SBA Office of Advocacy is an independent office 
which works with Congress on behalf of the small business 
contractor. Beginning in the early 1990s the Advocacy 
Office began to receive complaints from small business 
contractors about the loss of their ability to compete for 
government contracts. (Ref. 34) The contractors stated that 
one of the reasons for the loss was that numerous 
contracts, formerly available to them, were being 
consolidated into single large contracts. As a result, the 
contracts became too large, both in scope and dollar 
volume, for the small business contractor to compete for 
them. (Ref. 34)   
Due to these complaints, the Advocacy Office 
contracted with Eagle Eye Publishers for their analysis of 
existing procurement data in order to assess the impact of 
contract bundling government-wide on the small business 
contractor from fiscal years 1992 through 2001. (Ref. 38) 
Eagle Eye's review pertained only to prime contract data 




3. Congressional Data Sources 
Congressional data regarding DOD procurements pertain 
to fiscal years 1998 through 2002.  Congress has been 
closely reviewing DOD procurement data within this 
timeframe in order to determine whether or not acquisition 
reforms and contract bundling have helped or hurt small 
businesses. (Ref. 35) In fact, each year since 2000, the 
congressional Small Business Committee has used this data 
to issue a report card on the performance of each federal 
agency in achieving yearly small business goals. (Ref. 35) 
The DOD report card will be discussed later in this 
chapter. 
Due to the Eagle Eye Publisher's report on contract 
bundling, Congress directed the General Accounting Office 
(GAO), its investigative arm, to research the contract 
bundling issue. GAO published those results in, “Small 
Businesses, Limited Information Available on Contract 
Bundling’s Extent and Effects,” GAO/GGD-00-82, March 2000. 
(Ref. 39) 
4. DOD Data Sources 
DOD procurement data for acquisitions above the 
$25,000 threshold originated from data collected on 
Department of Defense (DD) Form 350, "Individual 
Contracting Action Report." (Ref. 40) Each service and DOD 
component reports every procurement action over $25,000 on 
this form to their respective headquarters. Each 
headquarter then submits the information to The Office of 
Secretary of Defense, (OSD) Directorate for Information 
Operations and Reports (DIOR). Ultimately, the DIOR submits  
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the data to the FPDC for incorporation into the FPDS. (Ref. 
40) Until FY 2001, the DD Form 350 did not include any 
contract bundling information. (Ref. 38) 
DOD also researched the contract bundling issue.  They 
contracted with the Logistics Management Institute (LMI) of 
McLean, Virginia. LMI published their report, "Case Studies 
in DOD Contract Consolidations, A Study for the Office of 
Small and Disadvantaged Business Utilization," in December 
2000. (Ref. 41)  
D.  THREE PERSPECTIVES REGARDING THE EFFECTS OF DOD 
ACQUISITION REFORM ON SMALL BUSINESSES, INCLUSIVE OF 
WOSBS AND SDBS 
1. SBA Office of Advocacy   
The opinion of the SBA Office of Advocacy of the 
impact of acquisition reform on small businesses is that 
some of those reforms negatively affected the ability of 
small businesses to obtain federal contracts throughout the 
1990s and into the early 2000's. (Ref. 34) For example, 
they state that the number of new contracts greater than 
the $25,000 threshold decreased from a high of 70,088 in FY 
1995 to 41,075 in 1999 across the federal government. (Ref. 
34)  
Because of the identification of the contract bundling 
issue, Eagle Eye Publishers reviewed FPDS data from Fiscal 
Years 1992 through 2001 for the purpose of determining 
whether or not contract bundling occurred in those years 
and was negatively impacting small businesses. (Ref. 38) 
Since the FPDS database did not contain specific 
bundling information for the years that Eagle Eye reviewed, 
Eagle Eye developed its own definition. They assumed that 
procurements coded in the database as providing multiple 
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goods or services being performed in numerous places and 
using different contract types were bundled contracts. 
(Ref. 38) They noted that the most frequently used 
contractual vehicles identified in the FPDS database were 
GSA schedules, inclusive of Multiple Award Schedules 
(MASs)and Federal Supply Schedules (FSS), and Indefinite 
Delivery Indefinite Quantity (IDIQ). (These contractual 
vehicles were identified previously in Chapter III of this 
thesis) However, they were not evaluating the FPDS data on 
the basis of the statutory definition. (Ref. 3) 
According to the official government definition from 
the Small Business Act, a bundled contract is one that 
combines two or more contracts previously suitable for 
small businesses, that because of the combination precludes 
a small business from competing for it.  The term "contract 
bundling" is only used when a small business is harmed by 
not being able to compete for a contract. (Ref. 3) When the 
combination of contracts does not harm a small business, it 
is considered to be a consolidated contract (Ref. 3).  
The Eagle Eye report concludes that in FY 1999 large 
businesses received 67 percent of all federal procurement 
dollars and 74 percent of all bundled dollars. (Ref. 38)  
In addition, they stated that although small businesses 
dominated construction and non-research services, 
significant contract bundling occurred in these sectors 
during that timeframe. (Ref. 38) The report also mentions 
that DOD is the largest bundler of contracts.  
However, as a result of direction from the Floyd D. 
Spence National Defense Authorization Act for fiscal year 
2001, GAO reviewed the DOD prime contract database for 
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fiscal years 1997 through 2000 specifically to identify any 
construction contract bundling. (Ref. 42) They reviewed 26 
contracts and identified five large contracts as limiting 
the ability of small businesses to compete for these 
contracts. (Ref. 42) The large contracts were also reviewed 
and approved by the SBA Procurement Center representative 
prior to award. Small businesses competed for the remaining 
21 contracts and received contract awards worth millions.  
Therefore, GAO concluded that contract bundling was not 
limiting the ability of small businesses to obtain military 
construction contracts. (Ref. 42)  
Although Eagle Eye publishers state in their report 
that significant contract bundling occurred to the 
detriment of small business during fiscal years 1992 
through 2001, DOD did not capture specific contract 
bundling information in the 1990s through 2000. This is why 
Eagle Eye needed to create its own definition. (Ref. 38) 
In conclusion, the main focus of the SBA Office of 
Advocacy regarding acquisition reform has been the negative 
impact of contract bundling on the small business 
contractor. (Ref. 34) In this researcher's opinion, they 
did not provide compelling evidence to prove or disprove 
that combining two or more contracts into one contract 
caused negative effects on small businesses, inclusive of 
WOSBs and SDBs.  
Based on the Eagle Eye contract bundling report, this 
researcher was not able to identify direct statistical 
evidence that contract bundling negatively impacted small 
businesses, inclusive of WOSBs and SDBs. In fact, DOD 
records indicate that small business participation from 
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fiscal year 1992 through 2002 averaged 20.5 percent to 21.9 
percent. (Ref. 43) Congressional records also document 
similar percentages for fiscal years 1998 through 2002. 
(Ref. 35) According to these statistics, there was neither 
a drastic reduction in the participation of small 
businesses nor a significant increase in their 
participation during these fiscal years. 
2. The Perspective of Congress on the Effects of 
Acquisition Reform on SDBs and WOSBs 
Primarily because of contract bundling, and to assess 
a statistical effect of acquisition reform on small 
businesses, inclusive of WOSBS and SDBs, Congress focused 
on the years after the enactment of FASA (1994) and FARA 
(1996). This was because Congress believes that contract 
bundling accelerated after enactment of these two 
acquisition reform laws. (Ref. 35) For this reason the 
congressional Small Business Committee issued yearly Report 
Cards beginning in 2000 on each federal agency regarding 
their achievement of the congressionally-mandated  small 
business goals.(Ref. 35) To reiterate those goals for DOD 
for purposes of this thesis, small businesses should 
receive at least 23 percent of total procurement dollars. 
WOSBs should receive at least five percent of total 
procurement dollars, and SDBs should receive at least five 
percent of total procurement dollars. (Ref. 35) 
The three figures provided below present data from 
congressional records regarding DOD's achievement of yearly 
small business goals for fiscal years 1998 through 2002. 
These goal achievements pertain to prime contracts awarded 
to small businesses. The figures are a compilation of data 
included in the House Small Business Committee Democrats 
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2002, Scorecard III (Ref. 44) and 2003 Scorecard IV. (Ref. 
35) Figure 1 is the overall small business goal 
achievement. Figure 2 is the WOSB goal achievement. Figure 
3 is the SDB achievement. 
 
Year Goal  (%)Tot  Prc $ $ to SB Goal Achievement (%) 
1998   22 113.1 23 20.89 
1999   23  115.7 24.5 21.16 
2000   23  126.2 27   21.41 
2001   23  142.8 29.3   20.53 
2002   23  155.2 32.9   21.17 
Figure 1.   Congressional Record of DOD Small Business 
Goal Achievement for Fiscal Years 1998 through 2002 
(Dollars in Billions). 
 
Figure 1 reflects, by fiscal year, the 
congressionally-mandated goal, total procurement dollars 
awarded, procurement dollars awarded to small businesses, 
and goal achievement percentage. In fiscal year 1998, small 
businesses received almost 21 percent of the total 
procurement dollars ($113.1 billion) spent that year. In 
1999 small businesses received 21.16 percent of the $115.70 
billion procurement dollars spent. Between 1999 and 2000 
DOD total procurement dollars spent increased to $126.2 
billion, while the small business goal achievement 
increased to 21.41 percent. From 2000 to 2001, the 
procurement dollars spent increased to $142.8 billion while 
the small business goal achievement decreased to 20.53 
percent.  Between 2001 and 2002, the procurement dollars 
spent increased to $155.2 billion, and the goal achievement 
increased to 21.17 percent. 
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Year  Goal (%) Tot Prc $ WOSB $ Goal Achievement (%) 
1998   5 113.1 2.03 1.80 
1999   5 115.7 2.22 1.92 
2000   5 126.2 2.52 2.00 
2001   5 142.8 3.11 2.18 
2002   5  155.2 4.14 2.67 
Figure 2.   Congressional Record of DOD WOSB Goal 
Achievement for Fiscal Years 1998 through 2002 
(Dollars in Billions). 
 
Figure 2 shows, by fiscal year, the congressionally-
mandated goal, total procurement dollars awarded to small 
businesses, total procurement dollars awarded to WOSBs, and 
goal achievement percentage. Between fiscal years 1998 and 
1999, DOD WOSB goal achievement increased to 1.92 percent.  
Between 1999 and 2000, the goal achievement increased to 
2.0 percent.  From fiscal year 2000 to 2001, goal 
achievement increased to 2.18 percent and from fiscal year 
2001 to 2002, goal achievement increased to 2.67 percent. 
These statistics reveal that although DOD has not yet met 
the yearly 5 percent goal, there has been steady 
improvement since fiscal year 1998. The improvement may be 
due to FASA legislating the 5 percent goal, because prior 
to FASA, no yearly goal was set for procurement dollar 













Year  Goal (%) Tot Prc $ SDB  $ Goal Achievement (%) 
1998 5 113.1 6.6 5.81 
1999 5 115.7 6.9 5.93 
2000 5 126.2 7 5.56 
2001 5 142.8 4.78 3.32 
2002 5 155.2 7.01 4.52 
 
Figure 3.   Congressional Record of SDB Goal Achievement 
for Fiscal Years 1998 through 2002 (Dollars in 
Billions). 
 
Regarding SDB goal achievement, from fiscal year 1998 
to 1999, goal achievement increased to 5.93 percent.  From 
fiscal year 1999 to 2000, SDB goal achievement decreased to 
5.56 percent.  From 2000 to 2001, SDB goal achievement 
significantly decreased to 3.32 percent. However, the 
researcher found no DOD documented reason to explain this 
decline during that timeframe. From fiscal year 2001 to 
2002, SDB goal achievement increased to 4.52 percent.  
In "Scorecard IV, Federal Agencies: Closed to Small 
Business,” June 25, 2003, the congressional Small Business 
Committee assigned letter grades A through F to agencies' 
(inclusive of DOD's) yearly performance in meeting their 
small business goals (Ref. 35). A was the top grade and F 
was a failing grade. The committee gave DOD an F for fiscal 
year 2002. Although DOD received A's for overall 
achievement of 92 percent of the small business goal, and 
met the SDB goal, they received an overall grade of F for 
failure to meet the 5 percent goal for WOSBs. Therefore, 
Congress considered DOD's small business goal achievement 
in 2002 to be a failure. (Ref. 35) 
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3. The General Accounting Office Report On Contract 
Bundling 
In 1999, Congress directed GAO to investigate the 
contract bundling issue for its possible negative impact on 
small businesses.  The resultant report is “Small 
Businesses, Limited Information Available on Contract 
Bundling’s Extent and Effects,” GAO/GGD-00-82, March 2000. 
(Ref. 39) The report focused on fiscal years 1997 through 
1999 and was critical of Eagle Eye's definition of contract 
bundling since they did not apply the statutory definition 
of contract bundling when they reviewed the FPDS data. 
(Ref. 39) The study looked at NASA (Johnson Space Center), 
the Department of Energy (Albuquerque Operations Office) 
and the Department of Defense (Wright-Patterson Air Force 
Base (WPAFB) cases of contract consolidations to determine 
the effect on small businesses. Although WPAFB reported 12 
cases of contract consolidation, they only had complete 
data on five of the cases.  In those cases, 15 contracts 
were consolidated into five contracts. They did not 
consider it to be bundling because small businesses were 
the prime contractors prior to and after consolidation. 
(Ref. 39) 
However, this situation demonstrates that 10 contracts 
previously available to small businesses decreased to five 
contracts.  In addition, total contract value of the pre-
consolidation was $115.7 million dollars.  After 
consolidation, that total value was $83 million. Because of 
the decrease in contracts and dollars awarded to small 
businesses, Congress concluded that combining contracts is 
detrimental to small businesses. (Ref. 35) 
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4. The Perspective of DOD on the Effects of 
Acquisition Reform on Small Businesses, Inclusive 
of SDBs and WOSBs 
DOD believes that acquisition reform has helped small 
businesses, especially WOSBs (Ref. 36). Figures 4 through 6 
present DOD statistics regarding small business procurement 
dollars awarded from fiscal years 1992 through 2002. (Ref. 
43)  
 
Year Goal (%) Tot Pr $ SDB $ Goal Achievement (%) 
 
1992 5 117.2 5.2 4.4 
1993 5 116 6.2 5.3 
1994 5 112 6.1 5.5 
1995 5 110 6.9 6.2 
1996 5 109.5 6.9 6.3 
1997 5 106.9 6.7 6.3 
1998 5 109.7 6.5 6 
1999 5 116.7 7 6 
2000 5 122.4 7 5.7 
2001 5 135.8 7.8 5.7 
2002 5 157.9 9.06 5.8 
Figure 4.   DOD Prime Procurement Dollars Awarded to 
Small Disadvantaged Businesses for Fiscal Years 1992 
through 2002 (Dollars in Billions) 
 
Figure 4 shows, by fiscal year, the congressionally-
mandated goal, total procurement dollars awarded, SDB 
dollars awarded, and goal achievement information. SDBs 
received 4.4 percent of total DOD prime awards in 1992 and 
5.8 percent of total DOD prime awards in 2002.  From a high 
percentage of 6.3 percent of prime awards in 1996 and 1997, 
that percentage decreased to a low of 5.7 percent of the 
$135.8 prime contract dollars awarded in fiscal year 2001.  
Finally, although DOD total prime dollars increased by 22.1 
billion, the percentage of procurement dollars awarded to 
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SDBs in fiscal year 2002 only increased to 5.8 from the 5.7 
awarded in fiscal year 2001. This upward trend represents 
DOD improvement in this area according to DOD's records. 
(Ref. 43)   
 
Year Goal (%) Tot Pr $ WOSB$ Goal Achievement (%) 
 
1992  117.2 1.6 1.4 
1993  116 1.7 1.5 
1994  112 1.9 1.7 
1995  110 2 1.8 
1996 5 109.5 2   1.8 
1997 5 106.9 1.8   1.7 
1998 5 109.7 2   1.8 
1999 5   116.7 2.3   1.9 
2000 5 122.4 2.6 2.1 
2001 5  135.8 3 2.2 
2002 5 157.9 4.1 2.6 
Figure 5.   DOD Prime Procurement Dollars Awarded to 
Woman-Owned Small Businesses for Fiscal Years 1992 
through 2002 (Dollars in Billions) 
 
Figure 5 pertains to DOD WOSB prime procurement 
dollars awarded for fiscal years 1992 through 2002. In 
fiscal year 1992, prime contract dollars awarded to WOSBs 
was 1.4 percent of the total dollars awarded.  The 
percentages awarded to WOSBs increased slightly from 1.5 
percent in fiscal year 1993 to 1.8 percent in fiscal year 
1995, although dollars awarded to primes decreased somewhat 
in those years.  Beginning in fiscal year 1998, prime 
procurement dollars awarded to WOSBs began to steadily 
increase, from 1.7 in fiscal year 1997 to 2.6 in fiscal 
year 2002. Based on these numbers, acquisition reform since 
1994 appears to be helping WOSBs win DOD contracts. (Ref. 
43) 
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Year Goal (%) Total Prc $ SB $ Goal Achievement (%) 
1992 22 117.2 24 20.5 
1993 22 116 24.9 21.4 
1994 22 112 24.8 22.1 
1995 22 110 25.3 23 
1996 22 109.5 25.4 23.2 
1997 22 106.9 24.5 22.9 
1998 23 109.7 23 21 
1999 23 116.7 25.1 21.5 
2000 23 122.4 26.9   21.9 
2001 23 135.8  28.3   20.8 
2002 23 157.9 33.3  21.2 
Figure 6.   DOD Prime Contract Procurement Dollars 
Awarded to Small Businesses for Fiscal Years 1992 
through 2002 (Dollars in Billions) 
 
Figure 6 applies to overall small business prime 
procurement dollars awarded by DOD for fiscal years 1992 
through 2002. It contains, by fiscal year, total prime 
procurement dollars and dollars awarded to small 
businesses. In fiscal year 1992, the DOD total prime 
procurement dollars awarded were 117.2 billion of which 
small businesses received 20.5 percent.  From a high of 
23.2 percent of 109.5 billion in procurement dollars 
awarded in fiscal year 1996, that percentage decreased to 
20.8 percent in fiscal year 2001, although the total amount 
of prime procurement dollars increased from $109.5 billion 
to $135.8 billion.  In fiscal year 2002, the prime dollars 
awarded were 157.9 billion, and the percentage awarded to 
small businesses increased to 21.2 percent. These 
statistics do not indicate a significant positive or 
negative impact on small businesses because of acquisition 
reform and/or contract bundling. (Ref. 43) 
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5. DOD'S Report on Contract Bundling 
As promised to the congressional Small Business 
Committee in 1999, DOD contracted with the Logistics 
Management Institute (LMI) to analyze whether or not DOD 
contract consolidation was creating a negative impact on 
small business contractors by preventing them from 
competing for DOD contracts. (Ref. 41) 
LMI reviewed ten cases of significantly consolidated 
DOD contracts in 1999. They stated that of the 112.2 
billion dollars in DOD purchases in fiscal year 1999, large 
businesses received 88.6 billion dollars, and small 
businesses received 23.6 billion dollars.(Ref. 41) In that 
fiscal year there were 5,760 large business firms, 18,581 
small businesses, and 4,677 SDBs receiving purchases above 
the $25,000 threshold.(Ref. 41) 
LMI found three cases of contract bundling. One was a 
Navy contract and two were Air Force contracts. In all 
three cases, contracts were awarded to small and large 
businesses. After contract consolidation, small and large 
businesses became subcontractors involved with these 
contracts (Ref. 41). 
In addition, prior to the ten cases of contract 
consolidation/contract bundling, small business prime 
contractors won nine out of the ten contracts.  After the 
consolidation, small business contractors as prime 
contractors decreased to five out of ten. (Ref. 41) 
The study also found that contracting agencies 
required proactive small business subcontracting goals when 
one of the consolidated contracts was awarded to a large 
business. (Ref. 41) Some contracting officers also made 
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subcontracting plans part of contract source selection 
criteria. They also included an award fee arrangement in 
contracts when large businesses met or exceeded small 
business goals. In other cases, the contracting officers 
unbundled consolidated requirements in order to make them 
available to small businesses (Ref. 41). This suggests that 
the contracting officer can play an important role in 
ensuring fair competition for small business contractors. 
Finally, the study recommended that DOD develop a 
consistent method for performing a cost-benefit analysis in 
order to justify consolidating contracts.  They said that 
this was needed in order to prevent incorrect 
consolidation, i.e., cases which would not provide DOD 
expected efficiency, and could cause loss of opportunities 
for small business contractors. (Ref. 41) 
E.  CONCLUSIONS 
1. Contract Bundling 
Statistically, the three contract bundling reports 
presented in this chapter did not prove nor disprove a 
significant positive or negative impact on DOD small 
businesses, inclusive of WOSBs or SDBs. However, this is 
possibly due to inconsistent methods of assessing contract 
bundling and incomplete data.  For example, in the GAO 
study, WPAFB reported 12 cases of consolidated contracts 
but only had complete information on five of them. (Ref. 
39) 
However, enough concern was generated from these 
studies that closer review of large contracts is occurring. 
(Ref. 44) In fact, since fiscal year 2000, contract 
bundling information is captured on the DD Form 350 as well 
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as being incorporated into the FPDS. (Ref. 40) However, to 
date, DOD has not submitted a contract bundling report 
based on the collection of this data. (Ref. 45)   
Because of the concern raised by the contract bundling 
issue, contracting officers must accomplish several tasks 
before awarding a bundled contract. They must conduct 
market research and justify in their determination and 
findings that contract bundling will provide measurable 
substantial benefits while meeting statutory and regulatory 
requirements. (Ref. 46) In addition, contracting officers 
must discuss their bundling strategy with SBA 
representatives. (Ref. 46) 
2. DOD'S Performance Regarding Small Business Goal 
Achievement  
Although DOD did not meet the 23 percent goal during 
the timeframe studied for this thesis, dollars awarded to 
small businesses have increased yearly. (Ref. 43) DOD prime 
contract dollars awarded to SDBs remained consistent 
throughout the timeframe studied for this thesis. (Ref. 43) 
Regarding WOSBS, DOD has yet to meet the 5 percent goal 
mandated by FASA; however, there was steady improvement 
from 1998 through 2002. (Ref. 43) In fact, procurement 
dollars awarded via prime contracts to WOSBs steadily 
increased in the 1990s, particularly after 1996. (Ref. 43) 
Therefore, acquisition reform appears to have had a 
positive effect on WOSBs both in congressional and DOD 
data. (Ref. 35) and (Ref. 43) 
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V.  CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
A.   INTRODUCTION 
This chapter's purpose is two-fold. It presents 
conclusions and provides recommendations resulting from the 
findings in this study. The chapter answers the primary and 
secondary questions presented in Chapter I. It concludes 
with suggestions for further research into the effects of 
DOD acquisition reform on women-owned small businesses and 
small disadvantaged businesses. 
B.   ANSWERS TO RESEARCH QUESTIONS 
This study addressed the following primary and 
subsidiary research questions. Provided below are each 
question and a brief response. 
1.  What are the Most Important Reform Initiatives 
DOD Has Undertaken Since the 1990s through 2002 
to Improve Acquisition? 
As the DOD budget declined steadily from the late 
1980s through 1997, DOD began to develop initiatives to 
improve its buying practices. The Section 800 panel report, 
discussed in Chapter II, identified over 600 statutes and 
approximately 300 laws to be repealed or changed to allow 
DOD to buy its goods and services more efficiently at a 
lower cost.  
Former Secretary of Defense William Perry was a major 
force in reforming DOD acquisition practices in the 1990s.  
His important initiatives became a major part of DOD's 
acquisition philosophy in the 1990s. Those initiatives 
focused on three distinct areas: the establishment of a 
combined defense/commercial national industrial base in 
lieu of a separate defense industrial base, the abandonment 
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of military unique specification (MILSPECs) requirements, 
and the need for DOD to rely more heavily on the commercial 
marketplace to buy its goods and services. 
The initiatives cited above resulted in key 
acquisition reform legislation in the 1990s.  
DAWIA (1991) established an acquisition corps and the 
requirement for DOD to train and certify acquisition 
personnel within a tri-level system that includes mandatory 
educational requirements at each level. (Ref. 24) 
FASA (1994) encourages DOD to acquire commercial items 
to meets its needs in lieu of military specification unique 
items. The law also elevated the threshold level for 
awarding contracts to small businesses from $25,000 to 
$100,000. In addition, FASA mandated a yearly goal of five 
percent of all procurement dollars to be awarded to WOSBs. 
Finally, FASA ushered in a new era of electronic commerce 
in order to lower the cost of federal procurement by 
reducing procurement cycle time and paperwork through the 
use of electronic media. (Ref. 29) 
ITMRA (1995) mandated the streamlining of information 
technology acquisition by encouraging the procurement of 
Commercial off the Shelf (COTS) products instead of 
government unique products. (Ref. 30) 
FARA (1995), also known as the Clinger-Cohen Act, 
incorporated ITMRA and introduced the term "efficient 
competition" into the acquisition arena. (Ref. 32) The law 
allows for the modification of the competition standards 
mandated by the Competition in Contracting Act (CICA)  
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(1984), by allowing the "use of procurement methods 
consistent with efficiency to fulfill the government's 
requirements in the most effective manner." (Ref. 31) 
Finally, FAIRA (1995) requires all federal agencies to 
submit an annual list to the Director of Management and 
Budget of all of those activities performed by federal 
employees that could be performed by private industry. 
(Ref. 33)   
2.  What Types of Products and Services Do Small 
Businesses Provide to DOD? 
Small businesses inclusive of WOSBs and SDBs have 
provided DOD with numerous products and services for many 
years. Some of those products and services include computer 
equipment and related software, systems integration, 
communications services, Internet web services, accounting 
and management support services, fire and security systems, 
network design and support, facilities management services, 
and engineering services.  In addition, they have also 
managed hazardous waste removal, provided research and 
development services and custodial services. 
3.   How Many SDBs and WOSBs Have Contracts with DOD? 
In fiscal year 2001 24,130 small business prime 
contractors, inclusive of WOSBs and SDBs, were performing 
on DOD contracts, and DOD awarded $28.3 billion prime 
procurement dollars to those businesses in that year. (Ref. 
36) and (Ref. 43) By fiscal year 2002, the number of DOD 
small business prime contractors, inclusive of WOSBs and 
SDBs, increased from 24,130, by 9,806, to 33,936. (Ref. 36) 
In that same fiscal year DOD awarded $33.3 billion prime 
procurement dollars to small businesses, inclusive of WOSBs 
and SDBs. (Ref. 43) 
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4.  In What Ways Have These Businesses Been Helped by 
Acquisition Reform? 
Data from fiscal years 1992 through 2002 indicate that 
acquisition reform appears to have helped WOSBs more than 
SDBs. This is due to the statutory requirement for DOD to 
award at least five percent of total procurement dollars to 
WOSBs. During this period there was steady improvement in 
the percentage of prime procurement dollars awarded to 
WOSBs, an increase from 1.8 percent in 1998 to 2.6 percent 
in 2002. (Ref. 43) A causative factor for this improvement 
was probably the five percent procurement goal for WOSB 
established by FASA (1994). (Ref. 29)   
5.  What are Some of the Barriers that Prevent These 
Types of Businesses from Obtaining DOD Contracts? 
Congress and the SBA Office of Advocacy and small 
business contractors maintain that the major barrier 
preventing these contractors from winning government 
contracts is contract bundling. Available statistics 
reviewed for this study did not prove definitively that 
contract bundling harmed small businesses during fiscal 
years 1992 through 2002. However, as noted here, those 
statistics are inconsistent and inadequate. In addition, 
small businesses continue to complain to Congress that the 
DOD contract bundling practice is preventing them from 
competing for government/DOD contracts. 
As a result, Congress and the SBA Office of Advocacy 
view the acquisition reform practice of contract bundling 
to be the major barrier preventing small business 
contractors from competing for DOD contracts. The search 
for other barriers consistently leads to the contract 
bundling issue. 
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6. What Assistance Currently Exists to Help Small 
Businesses Compete for DOD Contracts Either 
Directly as a Prime Contractor or as a 
Subcontractor? 
The small business contractor, inclusive of WOSBs and 
SDBs has numerous avenues of assistance available to help 
him or her compete fairly for federal contracts. For 
example, when DOD awards a contract over $500,000 to a 
large business, that business must maintain an approved 
subcontracting plan that includes small business 
subcontractor procurement goals, inclusive of WOSBs and 
SDBs. 
The small business contractor can contact the SBA 
Office of Advocacy for assistance, as well as Congress, 
with his or her complaints. Both houses of Congress have 
small business committees that review items specifically 
affecting small businesses. 
In addition to the above, DOD has Small and 
Disadvantaged  
Business Utilization (SADBU) offices not only at its 
headquarters but within the headquarters of each of the 
armed services and at their individual buying commands. 
Currently, to help ensure that small business 
contractors are not adversely impacted by contract 
consolidation, DOD must perform a cost-benefit analysis in 
order to preclude certain kinds of consolidation.   
7. What is the Role of the Small Business 
Administration in Assisting Small Businesses to 
Win DOD Contracts? 
As a result of the Small Business Act, the Small 
Business Administration has existed since 1953. One of its  
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primary missions is to ensure that the nation's small 
business contractors have a fair opportunity to compete for 
government contracts. 
SBA partners with DOD to assist in meeting DOD's 
yearly small business procurement goals. In addition, SBA 
places a representative at DOD buying commands for the 
purpose of reviewing procurements prior to contract award 
for potential impact on small businesses. The SBA 
representative also reviews the subcontracting plans of 
large DOD businesses for compliance with statutory small 
business goals. 
8. What is the Role of the Contracting Officer in 
This Arena? 
As a result of FASA, contracting officers must award 
contracts between $2,501 and $100,000 to small business 
contractors exclusively. The only legal justification the 
contracting officer has for not awarding these contracts to 
small businesses is if the officer cannot locate a suitable 
small business to perform a specific contractual effort. 
DOD contracting officers also ensure that 
subcontracting plans contain approved small business goals 
which are then incorporated into contracts when a large 
business wins a large DOD contract. 
As mentioned in the DOD contract bundling report by 
LMI, Inc., DOD contracting officers considered the 
potential negative effects of contract consolidation on 
small business contractors and tried to develop ways to 
negate those effects. For example, the contracting officers 
made subcontracting plans a part of source selection 
criteria for competitive procurements. In addition, 
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contracting officers incorporated award fee arrangements 
into large business contract awards in order to provide 
monetary incentives for large businesses to meet or exceed 
their small business subcontracting goals.  
Regarding contract bundling, whenever a contract 
consolidation effort crosses the desk of a DOD contracting 
officer, that officer is now responsible for insuring that 
the small business contractor is not unfairly excluded from 
competing for the contract because of the consolidation. 
Also, when appropriate, contracting officers can break 
out consolidated contracts into individual contracts in 
order to make them suitable for small business competition. 
Based on information provided above, the contracting 
officer plays a major role in insuring fair contract 
competition for the small business contractor. 
C.   CONCLUSIONS 
Specific conclusions can be drawn based on the 
research and analysis provided herein. They can be applied 
not only to DOD procurement but to the broad spectrum of 
federal procurement as well. 
1. Conclusion #1 
Small businesses, inclusive of WOSBs and SDBs, are not 
only vital to the American economy but to DOD as well. 
Over 50 percent of the American industrial base 
consists of small businesses. Small businesses also provide 
over 50 percent of America’s Gross Domestic Product (GDP). 
(Ref. 1)  
Small business contractors have provided numerous 
goods and services to the military for many years. Examples 
of those products and services include computer equipment, 
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software, communications services, network design and 
support, software training, engineering services, 
accounting and management services, and facilities 
management.  
Over 43 percent of the Pentagon renovation prime 
contractors are small business contractors. (Ref. 12) In 
fact, DOD relied heavily on those businesses to provide the 
rapid response necessary to repair and rebuild the Pentagon 
after the September 11, 2001 terrorist attack. (Ref. 12) 
Foam Matrix, a small business located in Inglewood, 
California and founded as a surfboard company, developed 
strong, ultra-light repairable composite foam which became 
the main component in the replacement wings of the X-45 
unmanned combat air vehicle. Because of this success, Foam 
Matrix will produce replacement parts for the C-17 military 
transport plane. (Ref. 12) 
Other examples indicate the importance of WOSBs and 
SDBs to DOD sustainment. In February 2001, the Defense 
Information Systems Agency (DISA) awarded the largest small 
business set-aside contract in American history. 
Consequently, DOD will receive government-wide global fixed 
satellite service bandwidth along with related business, 
enterprise satellite-based services and software 
applications. Artel, Inc., a small disadvantaged business, 
and Arrowhead Space & Telecommunications, Inc., a woman-
owned small disadvantaged business received two of the 
three contracts awarded under the set-aside. (Ref. 16) 
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A WOSB firm, Kelly Logistics Support Systems, provided 
the Air Force with a desktop simulator using commercial 
equipment that significantly improved user acceptance of 
voice recognition technologies for flight line maintenance 
applications. (Ref. 18)  
Finally, by fiscal year 2002, DOD contracted with 
33,936 prime small business contractors. (Ref. 36) 
Therefore, the small business contractor is not only vital 
to America's economy but to DOD’s sustainment as well.  
2. Conclusion #2 
FASA (1994) and FARA (1996) are the two Acquisition 
reform laws enacted in the 1990s appearing to have the most 
impact on small businesses, inclusive of WOSBs and SDBs.  
Among the major acquisition reform laws enacted during 
this timeframe, e.g., DAWIA, FASA, ITMRA, FARA, and FAIRA, 
the SBA Office of Advocacy and Congress state that FASA and 
FARA have had the most significant impact on small 
businesses. That impact has been negative, causing 
contractors to lose their ability to win government 
contracts because of the procurement practice previously 
identified as contract bundling. FASA and FARA resulted in 
bundling by encouraging the acquisition community to 
consolidate contracts. In many cases, the consolidation of 
those contracts minimized the ability of the small business 
contractor to complete for them because they became too 
large both in scope and dollar value.  
DOD does not agree with the assessments of the SBA 
Office of Advocacy or Congress regarding negative impacts 
on small businesses resulting from those acquisition 
reforms.  In fact, DOD states that acquisition reforms have 
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positively impacted small businesses, inclusive of WOSBs 
and SDBs. DOD supports its statement by providing evidence 
that small business contractors performing on DOD contracts 
increased by 9,806, from 24,130 in fiscal year 2001, to 
33,936 in fiscal year 2002. (Ref. 36) DOD also states that 
contracts worth $59 billion were awarded to small 
businesses, inclusive of WOSBs and SDBs, in fiscal year 
2002. (Ref. 36) 
3. Conclusion #3 
Data on contract bundling is inconsistent and fails to 
provide clear concise statistical proof of a negative 
impact on DOD small businesses, inclusive of WOSBs and 
SDBs. 
The contract bundling reports analyzed for this study 
provided little statistical proof of either a significant 
positive or negative effect on DOD small businesses. The 
SBA Office of Advocacy, Congress, and DOD assessment 
methods were inconsistent and insufficient. 
Eagle Eye Publishers, the company employed by the SBA 
Office of Advocacy to study the effects of contract 
bundling on the small business contractor, developed its 
own contract bundling definition instead of using the 
official one cited in the Small Business Act. As a result, 
the study did not conclusively prove that contract bundling 
occurred.  
In the GAO contract bundling study the Air Force 
reported 12 cases of contract consolidation but only 
provided complete data on five of those cases. Of those 
five cases, 15 contracts were consolidated into five 
contracts. Since small businesses were the prime 
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contractors before and after contract consolidation, GAO 
did not consider the consolidation to be contract bundling. 
However, this data showed a loss of 10 contracts previously 
available to small businesses. (Ref. 39) 
Finally, the DOD contract bundling report compiled by 
LMI, Inc. reviewed procurement data for 1999 only. (Ref. 
41)  The LMI report did not analyze enough DOD data in 
order to conduct a fair assessment of the impact of 
contract consolidation on the DOD small business 
contractor. 
4. Conclusion #4 
DOD statistics show neither a significant positive nor 
negative impact on small businesses, inclusive of WOSBs and 
SDBs, resulting from acquisition reform.  
Although the percentage of prime contract procurement 
dollars awarded to SDBs decreased during fiscal years 1996 
(6.3 percent) through 2000 (5.7 percent), DOD still met its 
annual SDB five percent goal during those years. (Ref. 43) 
In fiscal year 2001 the percentage of procurement dollars 
awarded remained at 5.7 percent, and in fiscal year 2002 
that percentage rose to 5.8 percent. (Ref. 43)   
Although the information for fiscal years 1996 through 
2000 reflected a downward trend in the percentage of 
procurement dollars awarded to SDBs, that trend did not 
provide proof of a significant negative impact on SDBs 
resulting directly from acquisition reform in those years. 
In fact, as stated above, by fiscal year 2002 the SDB award 
percentage rose to 5.8 percent of total DOD procurement 
dollars awarded that year. (Ref. 43) 
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The percentage of DOD prime procurement dollars 
awarded to WOSBs during fiscal years 1992 through 2002 
ranged from 1.4 percent to 2.6 percent respectively. (Ref. 
43) Although the statistics reflect continual improvement 
during this timeframe, the statistics do not reflect a 
significant positive impact on WOSBs during that period. If 
DOD had met the five percent WOSB goal during those years, 
that would have been a major accomplishment. 
Finally, overall DOD prime contract award statistics 
for fiscal years 1992 through 2002 show that small 
businesses, inclusive of WOSBs and SDBs, consistently 
received 20 and to 22 percent of total DOD prime 
procurement dollars. (Ref. 43) This percentage range does 
not conclusively show either a negative or positive impact 
on small businesses resulting from acquisition reform 
occurring during that timeframe.  
5. Conclusion #5 
DOD statistics regarding the five percent WOSB 
procurement goal legislated by FASA (1994) indicate a 
positive impact on WOSBs which could possibly be attributed 
to DOD acquisition reform.   
Although DOD did not meet the FASA mandated WOSB five 
percent procurement goal throughout the timeframe used in 
this study, there was consistent improvement from fiscal 
year 1998 through fiscal year 2002. (Ref. 43) For example, 
prior to FASA implementation, the percentage of prime 
procurement dollars awarded to WOSBs ranged from 1.4 
percent in fiscal year 1992 to 1.8 percent in fiscal year 
1996. (Ref. 43) After FASA implementation, the percentage 
of DOD prime procurement dollars awarded to WOSBs decreased 
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to 1.7 percent in only one fiscal year (1997). (Ref. 43) 
After that fiscal year the percentage consistently 
increased from 1998 (1.8 percent) to 2.6 percent in fiscal 
year 2002. (Ref. 43) Statistically, this data indicates a 
positive relationship between FASA and the percentage of 
DOD prime procurement dollars awarded to WOSBs. More than 
likely, the FASA legislated WOSB five percent procurement 
goal increased DOD's attention and focus on WOSB 
procurement which in turn enabled more women to 
successfully compete for and win DOD contracts. (Ref. 29) 
D.   RECOMMENDATIONS 
Four recommendations are provided as a result of the 
research and analysis presented in this study. The 
recommendations are applicable to the broad scope of 
federal procurement as well as to DOD procurement. 
1. Recommendation #1 
The Government, inclusive of DOD, must develop 
consistent reporting mechanisms to accurately assess the 
impact of the acquisition reform practice identified as 
contract bundling.  
Research for this study found disparities in contract 
bundling information among the SBA Office of Advocacy, 
Congress, and DOD regarding the effects of contract 
bundling on small businesses, inclusive of WOSBs and SDBs. 
The disparities made it difficult to evaluate the impact of 
contract bundling on these businesses objectively. 
In order to accurately assess contract bundling 
effects on small business contractors, first and foremost, 
parties should reach consensus as to what contract bundling 
is and what it is not. The SBA Office of Advocacy, 
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Congress, and DOD reviewed contract bundling data and 
information from different perspectives.  This would have 
been acceptable if their reviews had been based on the 
official contract bundling data definition and if they had 
reviewed data from the same timeframe.  
DOD's contract bundling report covered one year (1999) 
only. This was certainly not enough information for DOD to 
accurately measure the impact of contract bundling on its 
small businesses, inclusive of WOSBs and SDBs. Accordingly, 
DOD needs to analyze procurement data spanning several 
fiscal years in order to more accurately measure whether or 
not small business contractors have been negatively 
affected by contract bundling.   
2. Recommendation #2 
DOD should compile and publish a contract bundling 
data report based on a review and analysis of GSA Multiple 
Award Schedules, Federal Supply Schedules, Indefinite 
Delivery Indefinite Quantity (IDIQ), and specific contract 
bundling data contained in the Federal Procurement Data 
System (FPDS) for fiscal years 2000 through 2003. 
DOD should now be able to analyze and report on 
contract bundling using the FPDS database because it has 
been reporting that type of information to the FPDS since 
fiscal year 2000. The FPDS DOD data review and report 
should include an analysis of information documenting DOD's 
purchases of goods and services under GSA Multiple Award 
Schedules (MAS) and Federal Supply Schedules (FSS) to 
determine whether or not contract bundling occurred through 
DOD use of these contractual vehicles. 
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Finally, the DOD FPDS analysis should closely review 
and analyze information regarding Indefinite Delivery 
Indefinite Quantity (IDIQ) contract awards. The purpose of 
that review would be to insure that large DOD requirements 
placed on these contracts because of consolidation were 
accomplished using the most cost effective and efficient 
method for DOD to acquire a particular good or service at 
that time and not just for the convenience of the buying 
command. 
3. Recommendation #3 
DOD needs to be more consistent in capturing WOSB and 
SDB subcontractor procurement data. 
While conducting research for this study, the author 
noticed that there was some information regarding an 
increase in the amount of DOD subcontracting efforts 
awarded to WOSBs and SDBs in the 1990s through 2002.  
However, during that timeframe DOD focused primarily on 
documenting small business prime contract awards and not on 
documenting subcontracting awards. It is possible that DOD 
performance in meeting small business procurement goals was 
better than indicated because of its subcontracting efforts 
during fiscal years 1992 through 2002. However, because DOD 
did not accurately and consistently capture that data in 
those years, it is impossible to assess its performance in 
this area. Therefore, DOD needs more accurate and 
consistent mechanisms for reporting small business 
subcontracting efforts in order to receive the full credit 
it deserves for achieving small business goals. 
4. Recommendation #4 
DOD should conduct a specific study of the effects of 
acquisition reform on WOSBs and SDBs. 
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Scant information exists to indicate either 
significant positive or negative effects of DOD acquisition 
reform on WOSBs or SDBs, other than inconsistent 
information regarding contract bundling. In order to 
respond accurately to Congress and to the SBA Office of 
Advocacy about its yearly small business goal achievements, 
DOD needs to develop a checklist. It should include, at a 
minimum, information on DOD increased reliance on the 
commercial marketplace to buy its goods and services and 
the requirement for DOD contracting officers to award 
procurements between $2,501 to $100,000 exclusively to 
small businesses. It can then use this checklist to develop 
metrics for measuring the effects of acquisition reform on 
WOSBs and SDBs. Once DOD develops the checklist and 
associated metrics, it can then select a specific timeframe 
such as fiscal years 1998 through 2003 for its analysis. If 
DOD performs this type of analysis, it might then be able 
to proactively develop and implement a plan to mitigate 
negative acquisition reform effects on WOSBs and SDBs.  
E.  SUGGESTIONS FOR FURTHER RESEARCH 
The researcher suggests two specific areas for further 
research as a result of this study. First, DOD needs to 
continue to closely monitor the contract consolidation 
issue. DOD must do this in order to be aware of its 
potential negative impact on small business contractors and 
therefore on America's economy. Although the statistics 
reviewed for this study failed to prove significant harm to 
the small business contractor, inclusive of WOSBS and SDBs 
as a result of contract consolidation, there were definite 
indications that this practice is causing harm to these 
contractors. 
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Secondly, DOD should research subcontracting data from 
the 1990s to 2002 to determine whether or not that 
information would have reflected a more accurate account of 
DOD's performance regarding its small business goals, 
inclusive of WOSBs and SDBs, during that timeframe. This 
research is necessary in order to fully understand the 
impact (positive or negative) of acquisition reform on the 
small business contractor.  
In conclusion, until all of the procurement data 
regarding dollars awarded to small business contractors in 
either their role as a DOD prime contractor or 
subcontractor is captured, a comprehensive statistical 
study regarding the effects of acquisition reform on the 
small business contractor, inclusive of WOSBs and SDBs, 
cannot be completed. DOD should receive credit from the SBA 
Office of Advocacy and Congress for its small business 
subcontracting efforts as a way of helping it to meet its 
yearly small business goals.  In order to accomplish that, 
DOD needs to find a better way of documenting that 
information.   
F.  THESIS CONCLUSION 
The percentage of DOD prime procurement dollars 
awarded to small businesses, inclusive of WOSBs and SDBs, 
during fiscal years 1992 through 2002 consistently ranged 
from 20 percent to 22 percent. (Ref. 43) These statistics 
indicated neither significant negative nor positive effects 
of acquisition reform occurring during that timeframe. 
However, there were some indicators presented in the study 
that showed that the effects brought about by acquisition  
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reform practices such as contract bundling were and are 
negatively impacting the ability of small businesses to win 
federal contracts. 
An analysis of DOD procurement statistics for fiscal 
years 1992 through 2002 indicated that WOSBs were the small 
business contractor group obtaining the greatest benefit 
from DOD acquisition reform during those years. However, 
although DOD improved in this area through fiscal year 
2002, it did not meet the five percent goal in any of the 
fiscal years of this study.  
As of fiscal year 2003, DOD still had not met the WOSB 
five percent goal.  Current research indicates that 
businesses owned by women are among the fastest growing 
segment of the American business economy and they are 
involved in all facets of the business world. (Ref. 20) 
This suggests that DOD should be able to eventually meet 
the five percent goal. 
In conclusion, statistical proof of specific effects 
of DOD acquisition reform on WOSBs and SDBs remains 
elusive.  To date there has been no organized, centralized 
process established to not only identify the effects but to 
accurately measure them as well. Therefore, the net impact 
of DOD acquisition reform on small businesses, inclusive of 
WOSBs and SDBs, remains unclear. 
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